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THE CANADIAN AUDIT MARKET
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Abstract: This paper explores the structure of the Canadian audit
market between 1901 and 1941 based on a sample of 3661 financial
statements from 956 firms. Two aspects of the market are examined:
first, the overall degree of market concentration, and second, the
existence of market segmentation. In addition, a specific concern of
the paper is to analyse competition between domestic accounting
firms and the international accounting firms leading to the merger
of major independent Canadian firms with international accounting
firm networks after World War Two. The data show a pattern of
increasing concentration during the period among a small set of
domestic and international firms. The data identify both a national
market and a series of regional markets for audit services. There is
also evidence of market segmentation by industry and stock ex-
change listing. Overall, the evidence suggests that the early Cana-
dian audit market was competitive but fragmented into a series of
niche markets. Domestic firms were able to compete with the inter-
national firms but the market was becoming increasingly concen-
trated.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the structure of the Canadian audit
market in the first half of the 20th century. This is a key period
for the development of the audit market and audit firms in
Canada. The first full time public accounting firms appeared in
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the mid-1800s but were initially concerned primarily with
bankruptcy and receivership work. The change in focus of the
accounting firms from bankruptcy to attest work began in the
1900s based on the introduction of statutory audits. The re-
quirement of audits for public companies was written into the
Ontario Companies Act of 1907 and the Canada Companies Act
of 1917 (see Murphy [1988] for a discussion of the evolution of
these requirements). The banks also fell under statutory audit
requirements. After a series of bank failures [Naylor, 1975a],
the Bank Act was revised in 1911 to require shareholder audits
and again in 1913 to require external audits. After a bank
failure in 1923, the Bank Act was further revised to require dual
auditors, auditor rotations and to prohibit a bank auditor from
providing other services to banks [Richardson and Lew, 1992].
By the mid-1920s the Canadian auditing market had thus taken
its current institutional form.
Although a substantial body of work has documented and
analysed the emergence and development of financial reporting
and professional associations in Canada (see Murphy [1993] for
an anthology of this literature), there have been no studies of
the development of the Canadian audit market and the firms
that served this market. The absence of such studies is unfortu-
nate. An understanding of the structure of the early audit mar-
ket would be useful, for example, in gauging the degree of
change in audit concentration brought about by the recurrent
waves of mergers in the industry. It would also allow an assess-
ment of the impact of the liberalization of the trade in services
(e.g., under the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations) on the fortunes of do-
mestic firms. More generally, at the moment, there is no
baseline for assessing changes in the market for audit services.
This paper addresses this gap in the literature focussing on
the crucial first half of the 20th century in which the audit
market began to assume its present form. The dimensions on
which the audit market will be described have been informed
by the literature on the relationship between industry structure
and economic performance [Scherer and Ross, 1990; Baumol,
Panzar and Willig, 1988; Cubbin, 1988]. In brief, this literature
is concerned with the effect on social welfare of deviations in
industry structure from the ideal of perfect competition. Al-
though there are other models of industry structure that are
consistent with competitive behaviour, the classical model of
perfect competition is the most stringent and is used here as a
benchmark. The key issues are thus the extent of market con-
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/5
111Richardson: Canadian Audit Market
centration among suppliers and market segmentation. Each of
these dimensions reflects the ability of firms to extract mo-
nopoly rents in the market (i.e., to restrict supply and/or in-
crease prices above their competitive baseline) or to engage in
strategic behaviour with respect to other firms in the market.
Since the existence of monopoly rents is unobservable, this
paper follows the tradition in the industry structure and perfor-
mance literature by examining key structural attributes of the
audit market and using these attributes to infer potential per-
formance issues. The paper addresses three research questions:
first, who audited Canadian public companies during this pe-
riod and how concentrated was the supply of audit services;
and, second, how was the audit market segmented among ac-
counting firms? These research questions are overlaid with a
third, more general, question reflecting a concern with the
openness of the Canadian market within the global economy:
how did domestic accounting firms fare in competition with
foreign accounting firms?
The first research question seeks to document the distribu-
tion of audit services among different suppliers. In a perfectly
competitive market all suppliers implement the same produc-
tion function and are price takers within the market. In this
setting the marketplace will be composed of many firms of
similar size. The first question is thus concerned with the possi-
bility that one or more firms have achieved a sufficient scale of
operations that their actions can affect market prices or supply.
The empirical literature has found a positive relationship be-
tween industry concentration and profits [Cubbin, 1988, p. 52].
The literature suggests that in concentrated industries prices
may rise between 10 and 20% above their level in competitive
markets.
The second research question looks at market segmenta-
tion. If the demand for audit services can be broken down into
a series of niche markets, then it is possible that a firm may be
able to achieve monopoly pricing with respect to a particular
niche. Geographic constraints on practice [Chan, 1995] and
specialized knowledge required for particular industries or
capital markets [Danos and Eichenseher, 1982] may serve as
barriers to entry to particular niches of the market. The exist-
ence of market segmentation thus provides evidence of devia-
tion from the ideal of perfect competition. Empirical studies of
market segmentation suggest that prices may be increased be-
tween four and 34% above competitive levels in such markets
[Cubbin, 1988, p. 55].
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The third research question examines the effect of competi-
tion between domestic and foreign firms on the structure of the
Canadian audit market. Canada is a small, open economy. For-
eign accounting firms, i.e. those originating in Great Britain
and the United States, were present in Canada virtually from
the beginning of the market for audit services. These firms grew
along side domestic firms and competed for the Canadian audit
market. The dynamics of international competition in this mar-
ket provide insights into the emergence of international ac-
counting firms/networks.
DATA
The paper is based on 3661 financial statements from 956
client firms published in The Annual Financial Review, Cana-
dian [Briggs and Houston, eds.] between 1902 and 1941 when it
ceased publication.1  These volumes include financial state-
ments dated between 1901 and 1941. The Review presented a
summary of the annual reports of the major Canadian firms
through this time period. The summary included the main fi-
nancial statement information and the name of the auditor(s)
and other key officers. It did not include the auditors’ certifi-
cate. This series has been used as a source of information about
Canadian financial reporting practices [Murphy, 1988] in the
absence of archives of early Canadian annual reports. This data
source has not been used however to explore the early Cana-
dian audit market.
Although this is a rich and unique source of data on early
Canadian companies’ financial statements, the database has
limitations. The financial statements included in the Review re-
flect the willingness of companies to provide data in an era of
voluntary disclosure and the editors’ choices of which firms to
include to maximize sales of their publication. While these se-
lection criteria ensure that the most significant companies in
Canada through this time period are included, there may be
biases in the coverage. It is likely, for example, that the compa-
1The data used are all financial statements published in Volumes 2, 6, 9,
11, 13, 20, 21, 22, 26, 31, 36 and 41. Each volume includes financial statements
dated up to three years prior to the year of publication. The volumes generate
approximately 500 financial statements in each of the periods used for analysis
(see Tables 2 and 3). The sample size was limited by lack of availability of the
complete series and the cost of transcribing the volumes into machine-read-
able form.
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nies included are the larger companies in Canada, with widely
dispersed shareholdings or closely held-companies with signifi-
cant impacts on competitors. Since this is not a random sample
from a universe of Canadian firms and there is no reliable data
on the population of firms in Canada through this period, no
attempt will be made to generalize from the sample.2
ANALYSIS
Among the 3661 financial statements reviewed, 2823 in-
cluded a listing of the auditor (or auditors in the case of dual
auditors). Most of those financial statements where no auditor
is listed are dated prior to the introduction of a mandatory
audit requirement in the Ontario Companies Act of 1907, the
Bank Act of 1913 and the federal Companies Act of 1917. In
order to develop a profile of the market during the period under
examination, the audit firms that represented continuations of
partnerships and named individual members of firms were
grouped together. For example, the Clarkson firm is taken to
include the firms named Clarkson Gordon Dilworth, Clarkson
Gordon Dilworth & Nash, Clarkson Gordon Dilworth Guilfoyle
& Nash, Clarkson & Cross, Clarkson Cross & Helliwell, and the
individuals ERC Clarkson and GT Clarkson3  (among others).
The number of financial statements audited by the firms was
then summed. Table 1 provides a listing of the major audit
firms in Canada between 1901 and 1941. This Table also lists
the firms and individuals grouped under a common firm name
for analysis. It should be noted that even with this consolida-
tion of the audit firms in the sample, there are 316 separate
firms/auditors listed in the database.
The data in Table 1 provides evidence of market concentra-
tion among audit firms. More formally, the degree of concen-
tration discussed below will focus on the concentration ratio,
2 Statistics Canada Historical Statistics of Canada Series R783-794 (avail-
able via the Internet) provides a listing of the number of companies and the
value of their production at five-year increments beginning in 1900. The num-
ber of companies in the sample by year correlates significantly with this series
(r=0.95 all companies, r=0.92 companies over $1 million in value of produc-
tion). Partial correlations controlling for year were not significant. These re-
sults suggest that the sample size for each year (i.e., the number of companies
included in each volume) is proportional to the growth in the economy but
that the sample may not be representative of the specific firms that constitute
the economy during this period.
3 Most early bank audits, for example, were attributed to individuals rather
than accounting firms.
5
Richardson: Canadian audit market in the first half of the twentieth century
Published by eGrove, 2001
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2001114
TABLE 1
 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
1 Price F S Price and N E Waterhouse; 392
Waterhouse Price Waterhouse & Co;
Price Waterhouse & Co, CA;
Price Waterhouse & Co, Toronto.
2 Clarkson Clarkson & Cross; Clarkson, McDonald, 266
Currie & Co;  Clarkson, Cross &
Helliwell;  Clarkson, Cross & Menzies;
Clarkson, Cross & Helliwell,
Vancouver;  Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth, CA;  Clarkson, Gordon,
Dilworth and Nash;  Clarkson, Gordon,
Dilworth and Nash,  CA; Clarkson,
Gordon, Dilworth, Guilfoyle and Nash,
CA; Clarkson, Gordon, Dilworth,
Guilfoyle and Nash; Clarkson,
McDonald, Curie and Co, CA;
Clarkson, McDonald, Currie and Co;
E R C Clarkson, FCA; G T Clarkson;
G T Clarkson, CA; G T Clarkson, FCA;
R J Dilworth, of Clarkson, Gordon &
Dilworth.
3 Ross A F C Ross; A F C Ross, CA; A F C Ross, 203
CA, FCA; J G Ross; A F C Ross; J W
Ross; James G Ross; James G Ross, CA;
Jas G Ross, CA; P S Ross; P S Ross &
Sons, CA; P S Ross & Sons; P S Ross
and Sons, CA; G G Dustan, CA; P S
Ross & Son; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
and Co.
4 Mitchell Marwick, Mitchell & Co; Marwick, 184
Mitchell & Co, NY; Marwick, Mitchell,
Peat & Co; Marwick, Mitchell, Peat and
Co, CA; Peat, Marwick & Mitchell &
Co; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co,
CA; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co,
NY.
5 Riddell Riddell, Stead, Graham & Hutchison; 125
Riddell, Stead, Graham & Hutchison,
CA; Riddell, Stead, Hodges, and Winter.
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 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
6 Touche G A Touche and Co; George A Touche 102
& Co; George A Touche & Co, CA;
Touche, Niven and Co; Geo A Touche
& Co.
7 Edwards Edwards & Ronald; Edwards, Morgan 86
& Co; Edwards, Morgan & Co, CA;
Edwards, Morgan, Clark & Co;
Edwards, Ronald & Co; George
Edwards, FCA; H Percy Edwards, FCA;
George Edwards, FCA; H Percy
Edwards, CA; George Edwards;
H Percy Edwards.
8 Scott C S Scott; C S Scott and Co; C S Scott 84
and Co, CA; C S Scott, FCA; John Scott,
CA; John Scott; John Scott & Co, CA.
9 Thorne Thorne Mulholland & Co; Thorne, 71
Mulholland, Howson & McPherson;
Thorne, Mulholland, Howson &
McPherson, CA.
10 Macintosh Macintosh & Hyde; Macintosh & Hyde, 65
CA; Macintosh, Cole and Robertson,
CA; Macintosh, Robertson and
Paterson, CA.
11 Deloitte Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co; 57
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths and Co,
London; Deloitte, Plender, Haskins &
Sells.
12 Milne Crawley Milne & Co; Crawley Milne 46
& Co, CA; Milne, Steele and Co; Milne,
Steele and Co, CA; Sharp, Milne & Co;
Sharp, Milne and Co, CA.
13 Creak Creak, Cushing & Hodgson; Creak, 45
Cushing & Hodgson, CA; G Creak; L
Cushing; C Hodgson; George Creak, CA.
14 Vigeon Harry Vigeon, FCA; Frank Vigeon 37
Harry Vigeon, FCA; Frank Vigeon, CA
Vigeon & Co Vigeon & Co, CA.
15 Young Ralph E Young; Ralph E Young & Co, 34
CA; Ralph E Young, FCA; Ralph E
Young, FCA; G E F Smith, FCA; Ralph
E Young & Co, CA; Toronto Ralph E
Young, CA; Charles Stiff, CA.
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16 McDonald George C McDonald & Co, CA; 33
McDonald, Currie & Co, CA;
McDonald, Craig and Co; McDonald,
Currie & Co, Montreal.
17 Barber Barber & Co; Henry Barber & Co; 27
Henry Barber, Mapp & Mapp; Henry
Barber, Mapp & Mapp, CA; Henry
Barber, Mapp & Mapp, and etc.
18 Barrow Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co; Barrow, 26
Wade, Guthrie & Co, NY; Barrow,
Wade, Guthrie and Co, CA.
19 Hardy A J Hardy; James Hardy, FCA. 25
20 Gunn Gunn, Roberts & Co; Gunn, Roberts 25
and Co, CA.
21 Oxley F H Oxley; F H Oxley and Co; F H 25
Oxley, FCA; Oxley & Johnson; Oxley
& Johnson, Halifax.
22 Neff A C Neff & Co; A C Neff and Co, CA; 25
A C Neff, FCA; Neff, Robertson Co, CA;
Neff, Robertson and Co; Neff,
Robertson and Co, CA; Neff,
Robertson and Co.
23 Helliwell Helliwell, Maclachlan & Co; Helliwell, 24
MacIachlan & Co, CA; Helliwell, Moore
& Maclachlan, CA; Helliwell, Moore
and Maclachlan, Vancouver.
24 Welch H J Welch, CA; Henry J Welch, FCA, 24
Toronto; Lawson, Welch & Campbell;
Lawson, Welch & Campbell, CA;
Lawson, Welch & Co; Welch, Anderson
and Co; Welch, Anderson and Co, CA;
Welch, Campbell & Lawless, CA;
Welch, Campbell and Lawless; Welch,
Campbell, Lawless and Parker CA.
25 Piers Piers, Evans and Co; T L E Piers; 24
T L E Piers, CA.
26 Haskins Deloitte, Plender, Haskins and Sells; 22
Haskins & Sells Haskins & Sells, CA;
Haskins & Sells, CPA; Haskins & Sells,
NY.
 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
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 Major Canadian Auditors, 1901-1941 (top 31 firms)
(continued)
Number of
Financial
Statements in
Name of Other Firms Included the Sample
Rank Audit Firm Audited
27 Langley J P Langley; J P Langley and Co; 22
J P Langley and Co, Toronto;
J P Langley, FCA. 22
28 Jewell F G Jewell, FCA; George S Jewell. 21
29 Stiff and Stiff Bros & Sime, CA. 20
Sime
30 Hudsons Oscar Hudson & Co; Oscar Hudson & 20
Co, CA; Oscar Hudson & Co, Toronto.
31 Mcauliffe McAuliffe, Davis & Hope; McAuliffe, 20
Davis and Hope, CA, London, NY
and Barcelona.
C
m
, where “m” refers to the number of firms used in the calcula-
tion. The concentration ratio measures the percentage of the
market served by some number of firms (typically 4, 6 or 8 firm
concentration ratios are calculated). The concentration ratio
has, historically, been used by regulators as a first test of the
degree of competitiveness of industries [Miller, 1955] and is
still used in Canada as a benchmark [Canada, 1991]. The em-
pirical evidence reviewed by Cubbin [1988] suggests that firms
gain monopoly power when the four firm concentration ratio
exceeds 60%. In Canada, under the Competition Act, a merger
between firms in the same industry may be prevented if the
four firm concentration ratio exceeds 65%. The concentration
ratio is also the most commonly used empirical measure of
concentration. It is the measure used in all of the existing stud-
ies of the audit market and so will be used here to allow com-
parison with those studies.4
4 The United States Department of Justice has adopted the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index as a first test of market concentration. This index is defined
as the sum of the squared percentages of market share of all firms in an
industry. This index has the advantage of including all of the firms in the
industry and is based on economic theory [Kwoka, 1995]. A variation of this
approach is to calculate an index based on a set number of firms. The mini-
mum value of the index would be 1/n where n is the number of firms [e.g.,
Wooton et al, 1994].
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The concentration ratio can be measured in several ways.
Ideally the degree of market concentration should be based on
the fees charged to clients. In the absence of such data, proxies
such as total sales or total assets of clients are used [Moizer and
Turley, 1987]. The institutional environment limits the choice
of measures of market share in the period under study. During
this period, for example, clients or auditors did not disclose
audit fees so this measure could not be used. In addition, the
financial disclosures required under Canadian legislation were
limited to balance sheets until 1951 [Anderson, 1977, p. 10] so
sales and other income statement data was not consistently or
reliably reported during this period. In this paper two indica-
tors of market share are used: the number of clients and the
value of assets audited.
The number of clients provides a reasonable measure of
market share where the clients are similar in size and/or there
are large fixed costs associated with the audit. In this sample,
the known bias in the sample is towards the inclusion of the
larger Canadian firms at the expense of smaller firms. Given
this distribution, the number or percentage of clients of an au-
ditor may be a reasonable surrogate for market share. Moizer
and Turley [1987] suggest that concentration measures based
on number of clients provide a lower bound to the actual level
of concentration as this approach makes the implicit and con-
servative assumption that all clients are charged the same fee.
This concentration measure is supplemented by a measure
based on the value of assets of clients audited by the audit
firms. This measure assumes that audit fees are proportional to
client assets. This assumption may be reasonable when the au-
dit is limited to balance sheet accounts and particularly prior to
the advent of statistical sampling that reduced the cost of large
audits (i.e., audits based on sampling methods will generate a
non-linear relationship between audit fees and the size of the
client). Moizer and Turley [1987] suggest that untransformed
measures of client size (i.e., using the actual value of assets or
sales rather than the logarithm of these variables) may provide
an upper boundary to the estimate of market concentration.
Taken together, then, the two measures reported provide a
range within which the actual concentration of the audit mar-
ket should fall.5
5 Consistent with this interpretation of these indicators of concentration,
the degree of concentration indicated by the number of clients is always lower
than the degree of concentration measured by assets audited in this sample.
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Over the entire sample period, the six largest firms by the
number of financial statements audited in the sample account
for 45% of audited financial statements (i.e., Price Waterhouse,
392; Clarkson, 266; Ross, 203; Mitchell, 184; Riddell, 125 and
Touche, 102). The largest four firms account for 37% of audited
financial statements. Table 2 and 3 track the change in the
distribution of financial statements and assets audited among
audit firms in the sample over five-year windows. The five-year
windows are used to smooth variations due to missing and
small sample years. In these Tables the Big-3 international
firms (Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick Mitchell, and Touche)
and the Big-3 domestic firms (Clarkson, Ross and Riddell) are
compared with the rest of the market combined. The final col-
umn provides the six-firm concentration ratio.
Table 2 shows the steady growth in the proportion of finan-
cial statements audited by the Canadian Big-3 firms during the
period from the turn of the century through the 1920s. The
International Big-3 firms dominate the market after 1916, most
likely due to Clarkson’s withdrawal from banking audits (dis-
cussed below). The pattern is somewhat different if assets au-
dited are used as the measure of market shares as in Table 3.
TABLE 2
Percentage of Financial Statements Audited
Total
Inter- No Number of Six-Firm
Canadian national Auditor Financial Concentration
Big-31 Big-32 Other Listed Statments3 Ratio
% % % % # %
1901-1905 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 241 NA
1906-1910 3.60 1.69 16.12 78.59 439 5.29
1911-1915 11.00 10.50 55.15 23.35 501 21.50
1916-1920 14.91 19.45 57.56 8.08 532 34.36
1921-1925 17.16 19.82 58.33 4.69 576 36.98
1926-1930 19.53 24.03 51.94 4.50 422 43.56
1931-1935 22.17 26.02 49.41 2.40 416 48.19
1936-1941 21.56 25.26 52.97 0.21 468 46.82
1 Clarkson, Ross and Riddell.
2 Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche.
3 66 financial statements were excluded because the year on which the report
was based was not given in the source material (although it could be inferred
from the year of publication this reduces the risk of misclassification).
11
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The Canadian firms briefly achieved parity in market share of
assets in 1935/36 when Clarkson audited the Canadian National
Railways (one of Canada’s largest firms) for one year. This brief
anomaly is discussed below. In general, however, the interna-
tional firms have dominated the national firms in terms of as-
sets audited since the First World War. By the end of the period
the six largest firms accounted for 46.82% of financial state-
ments and 61.79% of assets audited. If these two measures rep-
resent the bounds of a confidence interval within which the
correct level of concentration lies, then throughout the period
the level of concentration was below the threshold usually asso-
ciated with monopolistic behaviour.
By comparison, Shaw and Archibald [1970], based on 585
Canadian firms with year-ends in 1968 and assets over
$500,000 in manufacturing, merchandising, transportation and
utilities, reported that the largest four accounting firms audited
73.9% of assets or 41.4% of firms, and the largest six firms
audited 82.8% of assets or 56.1% of firms. The ranking of firms
in this later period is consistent with the data reported here
with Price Waterhouse leading, followed by Clarkson Gordon,
TABLE 3
The Market Share (by proportion of assets audited,
corrected for dual auditors1 ) of Major Audit Firms
in Canada 1901-1941
Inter- No Value of Six-Firm
Canadian national Auditor Assets Concentration
Big-32 Big-33 Other Listed Audited Ratio
% % % % $Billion %
1901-1905 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 $2.5 NA
1906-1910 2.74 9.49 11.24 76.53 $8.1 12.23
1911-1915 17.42 23.47 52.73 6.38 $52.2 40.89
1916-1920 14.52 38.96 40.12 6.42 $23.6 53.48
1921-1925 12.84 41.20 41.72 4.24 $31.4 54.04
1926-1930 15.30 30.92 39.41 14.37 $23.9 46.22
1931-1935 28.22 27.96 37.77 6.04 $23.6 56.18
1936-1941 25.92 35.87 37.53 0.68 $19.9 61.79
1 Where dual auditors are used, each auditor is credited with half the value of
the assets of the audited firm.
2 Clarkson, Ross and Riddell.
3 Price Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche.
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/5
121Richardson: Canadian Audit Market
Peat Marwick Mitchell, Touche Ross, Thorne Gunn Helliwell &
Christensen, and Riddell Stead. The largest changes in the
rankings from the pre-World War Two period to 1968 is due to
the merger of Ross and Touche and the merger of the Thorne
group of firms.
The pattern of auditor concentration discussed above is
also consistent with data on the early U.K. audit market as-
sembled by Anderson and Edwards [1997]. Their data for 1886
show that the six largest firms accounted for 24.4% of clients
while the largest four firms served 19.8% of clients. Similarly in
the USA, Danos and Eichenseher [1986] used Standard and
Poor’s Registry of Corporations to calculate eight-firm concen-
tration ratios of 45.3% in 1950, 52.8% in 1960, 60.1% in 1970
and 51.3% in 1980. More recent data for the U.S. [Wooton,
Tonge and Wolk, 1994] suggest that the six largest firms now
account for between 65% and 98% of clients (depending on the
population of clients used, e.g. specific stock exchanges) while
the four largest firms account for between 49% and 69%. Al-
though the evidence is drawn from different countries, it sug-
gests a continuing pattern of increasing concentration over a
100 year time frame.6
Even in this early state of the development of the interna-
tional firms, it is interesting to note that only three of the six
largest audit firms operating in Canada were national firms
(Clarkson, Ross and Riddell). The three international firms with
a significant presence in the Canadian market were Price
Waterhouse, Peat Marwick & Mitchell and George Touche. The
presence of the international firms during the development of
the Canadian audit market reflects Canada’s position as a
colony and the earlier development of the audit market in the
U.K. The expansion of the U.K. firms into Canada was driven
by the flow of capital from the U.K. into North America during
the late 1800s. As will be shown below this is particularly note-
worthy for certain industries.
Differentiation in the Early Canadian Audit Market: Scherer and
Ross [1990, p. 81] note that service industries are typically com-
petitive when viewed on an aggregate level. Looking more
closely, however, monopoly power can be created through
6Maijor and Von Witteloostuijw [1996] show that this pattern of concen-
tration did not occur in Holland due to regulations on accounting practice.
The trend towards concentration appears to be particularly supported by
Anglo-Saxon institutional structures.
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product differentiation or market segmentation that limits the
effective number of alternative suppliers. Three market
segments are examined in this section: specialization by indus-
try, geography and stock exchange listing. A market niche will
exist if there are barriers to entry to competitors, i.e., the costs
to competitors are higher than to the firm dominating that
niche [Geroski et al, 1990, p. 10]. The barriers may include
specialized knowledge related to specific industries, knowledge
of and investment in specific geographic areas, or knowledge of
and credibility to specific stock exchanges. It is assumed a
priori that domestic firms compared with the internation-
al firms will have better access to niches based on industry
knowledge and geography. International firms, compared with
domestic firms, will have better access to niches based on stock
exchange listing mainly because of their greater familiarity to
distant investors.
(A) Industry Specialization: The clients represented in the
sample capture most of the key sectors of the economy (an
obvious omission is the family owned firms). The largest client
firms based on the value of assets tend to be in the transporta-
tion, finance and public utilities (e.g., hydroelectric power) sec-
tors (see Table 4). The railway and banking industries have
been particularly important in the development of the Canadian
economy [cf. Naylor, 1975a,b]. The characteristics of these two
industries and their auditors are considered below.
Canada is a large and sparsely populated country. The rail-
ways were used to tie the country together and to mould a
national identity [Berton, 1970]. The creation of an interconti-
nental railway was an explicit condition of the Act of Union
that created Canada as a country in 1867. It was thought that
an east-west railway in Canada was the best defence against the
north-south expansionist ambitions of the U.S. The railways
allowed the natural resources of the Canadian west to be ex-
ploited providing an economical means of exporting wheat, pot-
ash and other resources from the interior to the seaports of
British Columbia or the inland waterways of the Great Lakes.
The railways also facilitated immigration and homesteading
that opened new Canadian territories. The railways were expen-
sive to build and operate, requiring government guarantees of
their securities to attract investors. Even with this support how-
ever, the railways proved unable to pay their debt charges and
shortly after the First World War many were nationalized
[Bliss, 1987].
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TABLE 4
Major Clients (Top 20 by value of assets) and their Auditors
Firm Industry Total Assets Auditor (s) listed between
(Maximum Value 1901 and 1941
in sample)
Canadian Pacific Railway $11,166,433,527 Price Waterhouse
Railway
Canadian National Railway $19,695,380,979 Clarkson; Touche
Railways
Bank of Montreal Banking $16,328,350,953 Graham; Hutchison;
Hodgson; Glendinning;
Gowan; McDonald; Riddell
Royal Bank of Banking $15,814,482,709 Marwick; Mitchell; Ross;
Canada Thomson; Shepherd;
McClelland; Sr Mitchell;
Brodie
Canadian Bank Banking $14,880,368,102 Mitchell; Price Waterhouse;
of Commerce Webb; Dewar; Marwick;
Shepherd
Sun Life assurance- $13,090,894,940 Brig. Ross
Assurance Co guarantee
of Canada
Royal Trust Co Trust $12,601,354,134 Hutchison; Paterson; Gowan
Cities Service Co investment $12,532,955,457 No Auditor Listed
Canadian Northern railway $12,357,389,648 Touche
Railway Co
Bank of Nova banking $12,161,327,293 Glendinning; Price Waterhouse;
Scotia Waterhouse; Mitchell; Riddell
Dominion Textile industrial $11,729,428,690 Ross
Co, Ltd
MacKay Co telephone $11,657,950,796 Barrow
Brazilian Traction railway $11,628,799,060 Clarkson
Light and Power
Co. Ltd
Minneapolis St railway $11,560,600,985 Mitchell
Paul and Ste Marie
Railway Co
Union Trust Co Ltd trust $11,435,663,823 Cumberland; Neff; Niles;
Price Waterhouse
National Trust trust $11,417,880,494 Edwards; Scott; Touche;
Co Ltd Geggie; Mackay; Durnford;
Webb
Toronto General trust $11,416,574,440 Clarkson; Hardy; Spence;
Trusts Corp Macbeth
Imperial Bank banking $11,324,139,893 Clarkson; Dilworth; Mitchell;
of Canada Macintosh; Price Waterhouse
Canada Life assurance- $11,213,499,630 Young
Assurance Co guarantee
Bank of Toronto banking $11,118,459,249 Clarkson; Glendinning;
McClelland; Shepherd; Price
Waterhouse; Mitchell
15
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The railways were largely financed by bonds sold in the
London, UK, market [Bothwell et al, 1987, p. 178]. In fact the
majority of UK funds raised between Confederation (1867) and
the First World War were used to finance the construction of
Canada’s two transcontinental railways [Naylor, 1975a, p. 229].
Not surprisingly, then, the financial statements issued by the
railways were audited by U.K. audit firms: the Canadian North-
ern Railway was audited by George Touche until its national-
ization in 1919; the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) was
audited by Price Waterhouse; the Canadian National Railway
(CNR) was also audited by George Touche with the exception of
one year, 1935, when the Clarkson firm acted as auditor. This
incident deserves special mention, as the CNR is such a large
company that this change in auditors has a notable affect on
the aggregate data.
The brief incursion of Clarkson into railway audits is not
mentioned in the history of the firm [Little, 1964] nor is
Touches’ brief loss of this client mentioned in that firm’s his-
tory [Collard, 1983]. In the years immediately after the depres-
sion Canada’s railways were in dire financial distress and in
1933 the government of the day stepped in to attempt to save
the Canadian National Railway. Three trustees who had abso-
lute control replaced the Board of Directors of the CNR.7  The
trustees took office in 1934 and remained until mid-1936. The
auditors of the CNR were also directed to report directly to
Parliament rather than to management.
In 1934 George Touche acted as auditor (as he had in previ-
ous years) and laid before Parliament (and thereby the Cana-
dian public) a report on the capital structure of the CNR over
the previous twenty years. The report showed that the CNR was
essentially bankrupt but the firm had disguised this by inad-
equate charges for depreciation and obsolescence, and by treat-
ing government infusions of cash as equity rather than debt
[Thomson, 1938, p. 684]. This report was apparently not well
received by government.
The general public believes . . . that because part of the
content of these reports did not please the government
of the day [a Conservative majority government], the
auditing services of Messrs. George Touche & Co. were
terminated in the year 1935 [Thomson, 1938, footnote
149].
7 An Act respecting the CNR and to provide cooperation with the CPR
system and other purposes 23-24 George V C.33 1933.
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Touche was replaced as auditor by Clarkson for 1935. In
October of 1935 a federal election was held. The Conserva-
tive Party on dissolution of parliament held 137 seats; the
Liberal Party held 88 seats and other groups held 20 seats.
After the election the Liberal Party held 171 seats, the Conser-
vative Party 39 seats and others held 35 seats. The new Liberal
Government quickly set about undoing the management struc-
ture of the CNR put in place by the previous government. A
1936 Act amended the 1933 Act, bringing back a Board of Di-
rectors and separate executive team. One of this group’s first
decisions was to return the audit to Touche; thus, ended the
brief engagement of Clarkson as auditor of one of Canada’s
largest companies.
The financial sector is a crucial one for the auditors given
the introduction (after the 1913 and 1923 Bank Act revisions) of
mandatory audit requirements for the banks, the two-auditor
requirement and rotation of auditors. These statutory require-
ments provided a large and stable market for audit services that
provided a springboard for the growth of the audit firms
[Cowperthwaite, 1986, p. 10]. In addition, the banks by the
First World War were routinely requiring audited financial
statements to use as a basis for commercial lending. It is likely
that audit firms that served as bank auditors would be more
familiar to bank officers and, therefore, more likely to be rec-
ommended to their customers [cf. Shockley and Holt, 1983].
Under Canadian law, the four pillars of finance — banking,
trust, insurance and stock brokerage — had to be carried out by
separate companies, hence the presence of trust companies and
insurance companies among the list of large clients.
The banking industry was founded on a mixture of capital
from the U.K. and domestic sources. Many of the first banks
drew on U.K. funds and were primarily involved in providing
short-term credit to allow farmers to transport their goods to
market and merchants to finance their inventories. These banks
focused on the large urban centres and on the more populous
provinces. In the Prairie Provinces and in smaller centres, mer-
chants and farmers pooled their resources to create banks to
serve their needs [Bliss, 1987, Chapter 10; Naylor, 1975a, Chap-
ter 3]. In this sense “the Canadian banking industry was a trun-
cated import from Britain” [Naylor, 1975a, p. 110]. These
sources of capital suggest that both domestic and international
audit firms would have opportunities in this market.
The banking industry also has a more complex audit mar-
ket than the transportation industry as a result of statutory
17
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requirements. The dual auditor provision introduced in 1923
provided many opportunities for the smaller Canadian firms to
gain experience in bank audits and it is common in the sample
to see a Canadian firm acting as the junior auditor along side
one of the international firms. For example, Price Waterhouse
audited the Bank of Nova Scotia for many years with either the
Canadian firm of Riddell or Glendinning as the second auditor.
By the end of the period, however, Canadian firms were disap-
pearing from bank audits: for example in 1941 the Imperial
Bank of Canada, Dominion Bank, Canadian Bank of Commerce
and Bank of Nova Scotia were all audited by Peat Marwick
Mitchell. The notable exception was the Bank of Montreal
(Canada’s largest bank) audited by the Canadian audit firms
McDonald Currie and Riddell (as co-auditor) throughout the
period.
The gradual withdrawal of Canadian audit firms from the
banking industry may reflect the changing nature of banking or
the limitations imposed on auditors by the Bank Act. Clarkson
had been a major player in bank audits in the early part of the
period (prior to 1923). The Clarkson firms were auditors of the
Standard Bank, the Dominion Bank, the Bank of Toronto, the
Bank of Canada, and the Imperial Bank of Canada. In 1923 the
Bank Act was revised and auditors were prohibited from pro-
viding any other services to the banks if the firm acted as the
banks’ auditor. In hearings before the Senate banking commit-
tee on the proposed Act, G.T. Clarkson gave testimony that if
that provision was passed his firm would not be able to afford
to do bank audits and would withdraw from the field
[Beckhart, 1929]. He appears to have been good to his word
[Little, 1964, p. 26].
Other firms may have lost audit clients due to the changing
geographic pattern of banking. Initially the banks’ capital came
from commercial term deposits and share subscriptions. These
funds quickly proved inadequate to meet the demand for loans.
As the banks lowered their administration costs, it became cost
effective for them to expand their retail operations and secure
loan funds from demand deposits [Naylor, 1975a]. All of the
Chartered Banks during this period established national retail
branch networks. As will be discussed below under geographic
specialization, few Canadian audit firms had the office network
to match the expanding needs of these clients.
The extent of industry specialization among the six largest
firms can be seen in Table 5. Each of these firms displays a
distribution of clients by industry that differs significantly from
18
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the distribution of the total sample.8  In particular, the larger
firms (with the exception of Peat Marwick) show a higher than
average proportion of manufacturing clients. Peat Marwick’s
strength in the financial services and transportation industries
is evident in this table. Other notable industry concentrations
include Clarkson’s and Touche’s higher than average proportion
of clients in the natural resource sector and Ross’ concentration
in public utilities. The Herfindahl Index shows that the Big-
Three Canadian firms and the Big-Three International firms
were about equally diversified across industries (e.g., the aver-
age for the Canadian firms was 0.32 compared with 0.35 for the
international firms). The right hand column in Table 5 provides
the six-firm concentration ratios by industry. While individual
firms were specialized in certain industries, the level of concen-
tration does not appear to have provided monopoly power to
the firms.
Industry specializations are also evident among smaller
firms. The Milne companies, ranked 12th, had more than half
of their audits in light and power companies including Pennsyl-
vania Water and Power Co., Shawinigan Water and Power Co.,
Laurentide Power Co., Ltd, Canadian Light and Power Co., and
Quebec Power Co. The Langley firm, ranked 23rd, was concen-
trated in the mining industry particularly in Kirkland Lake.
Their clients included Lake Shore Mines Ltd, Macassa Mines
Ltd, Manitoba Basin Mining Co. Ltd, Murray-Kay Ltd, Premier
Gold Mining Co Ltd, Sylvanite Gold Mines, Toburn Gold Mines
Ltd and Tough Oats Burnside Gold Mines Ltd. As a final ex-
ample, F.G. Jewell, ranked 28th based on the number of audits
in the sample, is limited to mortgage companies, auditing the
Canada Trust Company, the Ontario Loan and Debenture Com-
pany, the Huron and Erie Mortgage Company, and the London
and Western Trusts Company.
(B) Geographic Specialization: In spite of its vast geographic
size, Canada’s economic activity is extremely concentrated.
There are regional differences in natural resources that provide
a natural focus for activity such as oil and gas in Calgary or
8 This statement is based on a Chi-square test between the industry distri-
bution of clients for each firm compared with the complete sample. All results
were significant at p<0.05 allowing the conclusion that the distribution of the
firms’ clients was more concentrated than would be expected if the clients
were a random selection from all clients.
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wheat in Winnipeg but the heart of Canada’s industrial and
financial activity is centred on the Great Lakes and the cities of
Toronto and Montreal. Toronto is listed as the head office on
33% of the financial statements in the sample, followed by
Montreal with 23%. The secondary centres of note include
Winnipeg, Manitoba (5% of financial statements: mainly re-
source companies), Hamilton, Ontario (4% of financial state-
ments: mainly industrial), Halifax, Nova Scotia (3.65% of finan-
cial statements: mainly financial institutions) and London,
Ontario (3.5% of financial statements: mainly insurance com-
panies). This pattern of economic development allowed for at
least two strategies for accounting firms: either to specialize in
one region or to diversify across a number of centres.
The extent of geographic specialization among the six larg-
est firms can be seen in Table 6. Each of these firms displays a
geographic distribution of clients that differs significantly from
the distribution of the total sample.9  Consistent with Collard’s
[1983] observations, the Ross firm was the most geographically
concentrated of the large firms with over 80% of its clients in
Montreal. Collard [1983, pp. 53-54] notes that the firm experi-
mented with branch offices (in Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa and
Quebec City) but was unable to make them successful. Ross
decided as a policy to “stick to their own backyard”. Clarkson
was highly concentrated in Toronto while Peat Marwick and
George Touche both have a higher than average proportion of
clients in western Canada (British Columbia, Alberta, Sas-
katchewan and Manitoba).
The Herfindahl Index reported at the bottom of Table 6
allows the extent of geographic diversification of the firms to be
compared. The Big-Three Canadian audit firms all have a
higher index values than the Big-Three International Firms.
This reflects the greater concentration of the Canadian firms’
clients in specific geographic markets. The international firms
have very low index values indicating a diversity of client loca-
tions across Canada. The right hand column in Table 6 provides
the six-firm concentration ratios by location. While individual
firms were specialized in certain areas, the level of concentra-
tion does not appear to have provided monopoly power to the
firms.
9 This statement is based on a Chi-square test between the geographic
distribution of clients for each firm compared with the complete sample. All
results were significant at p<0.05 allowing the conclusion that the distribution
of the firms’ clients was more concentrated than would be expected if the
clients were a random selection from all clients.
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The pattern of specialization in a restricted geographic area
is also common of the smaller firms. The firm of C.S. Scott, for
example, ranks as the eighth largest auditor during this period.
Their clients however were concentrated in Hamilton, Ontario
including Dominion Power and Transmission Company,
Hamilton Bridge Company, Frost Steel and Wire, Canadian
Westinghouse Co. Ltd., the Bank of Hamilton, Sawyer Massey
Ltd., and Tuckett Tobacco Co. Similarly, the MacIntosh firms,
ranked as the tenth largest auditor of the period, operated pri-
marily in and around Montreal, PQ including clients such as
Ames Holden McCready Ltd, Atlantic Sugar Refinery, Bruck
Silk Mills, Calgary Power Company (which in spite of the name
was headquartered in Montreal), Canadian Vickers Ltd., Con-
solidated Oka Sand and Gravel Co., Intercolonial Coal Mining,
MacLaren Power and Paper Co, Ottawa-Montreal Power Co,
Ltd, and Southern Canada Power Co., Ltd. The firm of Creak,
Cushing and Hodgson, ranked 13th, is also concentrated in the
Montreal area with clients such as National Breweries Ltd,
Ogilvie Flour Mills Co., Ltd, Paton Manufacturing Company of
Sherbrooke, Price Brothers & Co. Ltd, Tooke Bros Ltd, Interna-
tional Power Co. Ltd, Canada Iron Corporations, Ltd, and Ca-
nadian Airways, Ltd.
(C) Stock Exchange Listings: Among the 3661 financial state-
ments analysed, 2414 (66%) indicated that the firm was pub-
licly traded on at least one stock exchange. These financial
statements indicated a total of 3636 listings. The location of
these listings is summarized in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Stock Exchange Listings
Stock Exchange Number of Percentage
listings of sample Cumulative
Toronto 1666 45.85 45.85
Montreal 1349 37.10 82.95
London 324 8.91 91.86
New York 146 4.02 95.88
Vancouver 34 0.94 96.82
Calgary 32 0.85 97.67
Winnipeg 31 0.85 98.52
All other foreign
stock exchanges 54 1.49 100.00
Total 3636
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The data in Table 7 indicate that firms were predominately
listed on Canadian stock exchanges (approximately 87% of all
listings). Where these firms sought foreign funds, the most
common listings were on the New York and London stock ex-
changes. The firms listed on the London Stock Exchange were
primarily railways and public utilities (light and power com-
panies). Canadian National Railways and Canadian Northern
Railways are reported as listed solely on the London exchange
while Canadian Pacific Railways was listed on the Toronto and
Montreal exchanges in addition to being listed on the London
exchange. Other Canadian companies that limited their listings
to London include the Hudson Bay Company, Trust and Loan
Company of Canada and the Robert Simpson Company. The
New York Stock Exchange attracted a more diverse group of
Canadian companies and very few who chose to list solely on
that exchange (e.g., the International Nickel Company and
Borden Co.).
Within Canada, the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges
dominate the listings. These two exchanges account for eighty-
three percent (82.9%) of total listings. Naturally, given the
extent of listings on these exchanges, most sectors of the
Canadian economy are represented. The smaller Canadian ex-
changes tend to be specialized in resource-based companies op-
erating in the region of the exchange. For example, firms
listed on the Calgary exchange tended to operate in the petro-
leum industry (exploration and refining); firms listed on the
Vancouver exchange tended to be petroleum and mining firms.
The larger audit firms in the sample have a slightly larger
proportion of listed clients than smaller firms. For example,
among the six largest audit firms 75% of clients are listed while
among the bottom six audit firms on the ranked list in Table 1,
68% of clients are listed (among 121 audit firms that appear
only once in the sample 68.3% have listed clients). The rela-
tively small variation among large and small firms on this vari-
able is probably a reflection of the selection criteria used by the
editors of the Review. Presumably to ensure a market for their
publication they have focussed on those Canadian firms that
were followed by investors, resulting in a bias toward listed
firms, and/or were of interest to competitors, resulting in a bias
toward larger firms. Unfortunately in the absence of reliable
data on the population of firms during this period, it is impos-
sible to generalize beyond the sample at hand.
Among the top six audit firms, 75.9% of the clients of Cana-
dian firms and 76.2% of international firms were listed on at
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least one exchange. On average, therefore, Canadian firms dur-
ing this period were doing as well as the international firms in
attracting listed clients. Focusing on the clients listed on the
London and New York exchanges can refine this view of the
market. The big-three international firms in the sample had
11% of their Canadian clients with listings on the London ex-
change and 6% on the New York exchange. By comparison, the
big-three Canadian firms had 6.3% of their clients with listings
on the London exchange and 1.9% on the New York exchange.
These data suggest that Canadian companies listed on foreign
exchanges, particularly on the New York exchange, tended to
favour the international accounting firms.
DISCUSSION
 The data presented above show that the Canadian audit
market was becoming more concentrated over the first half of
the 20th century. Brozen [1982, pp. 27-38] identifies two time
patterns of increasing industry concentration. Concentration
based on technological innovation tends to occur in the early
years of a product’s life cycle and then is gradually eroded by
competition and further product innovation. This is not the
case in the Canadian audit market. The second pattern begins
with a diffuse market followed by increasing concentration
based on improved transportation and communications tech-
nologies, and economies of scale in production. Tedlow [1988],
commenting on the latter pattern, shows that the pace of con-
centration was uneven in the U.S. consisting of a series of sharp
rises in market concentration interspersed with periods of
stability. For most of the period considered in this paper the
level of concentration remained constant with the exception of
a surge during the late 1920s. The pattern observed in the Cana-
dian audit market is consistent with Brozen’s [1990] second
model of concentration but is at odds with Tedlow’s [1988]
findings. Both of these observations require comment.
Concentration in the Canadian audit market was not based
on technological breakthroughs that allowed firms to gain an
instantaneous comparative advantage. Rather, concentration
emerged gradually as firms differentiated themselves. A key fac-
tor in this process was the professionalization of accountancy
in Canada. The increasing concentration in the Canadian audit
market occurred simultaneously with the emergence of pro-
fessional associations of chartered accountants. The ten pro-
vincial institutes of chartered accountants, for example, were
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incorporated between 1880 and 1921. Although these bodies
did not attempt enact legislation that would give them a mo-
nopoly over practice, they did seek to differentiate themselves
from other practitioners. They were successful, for example, in
having early legislation that required audits specify that the
auditor should be a chartered accountant “or other expert
accountant” [e.g., the Ontario Municipal Act, 1897; the Federal
Trust Company Act, 1919; and, the Bank Act, 1923. Cf.
Richardson, 2000, pp. 106-107]. This format elevated the status
of chartered accountants but carefully allowed “others” to
practice. The additional clause ensured that the chartered ac-
countants would not be accused of seeking a monopoly and
prevented a call for the chartered accountants’ Institutes to
grandfather all those currently in practice into membership.
The chartered accountants’ institutes also established ap-
prenticeship rules that required potential entrants to serve
within an accounting firm prior to writing their examinations.
This requirement had three effects. First, it provided an effec-
tive barrier to entry to possible auditors and allowed existing
firms to grow rapidly based on these entrants. Second, it pro-
vided the firms with economies of scale. In most service indus-
tries, economies of scale are very limited since the service is
based on face-to-face interaction with the service provider.
Some economies of scale are possible by delegating lower level
tasks to others but this approach is limited by the extent to
which the service is decomposable and by the cost differentials
between alternative providers. In the case of apprentices, since
they will have most of the necessary skills after some period of
training a large portion of the audit task can be delegated. Also
during this period apprentices were given a meagre stipend or
in some case would be charged for the opportunity to train in
the firm. Finally, it allowed firms to differentiate themselves
based on the training opportunities provided to apprentices.
This gave large firms a competitive advantage in seeking out
apprentices and hence to grow faster relative to smaller firms.
The rise in concentration levels is also consistent with the
effects of improving transportation and communications sys-
tems on the ability of firms to expand their markets. For ex-
ample, in 1911 Clarkson, headquartered in Toronto, sent his
nephew (Helliwell) to Vancouver to open a branch of the firm.
It became evident after a few years that this arrangement was
not workable and the Vancouver firm was allowed to continue
on its own account [Crate, 1970]. Clarkson was able to open
offices in Ontario and Quebec, however, where it was easier to
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maintain contact including offices in Montreal (1922), Windsor
(1929), Ottawa (1929) and Hamilton (1938) [Little, 1964, p. 36].
It was not until 1945 that Clarkson opened an office in
Vancouver that was integrated with the rest of the firm [Little,
1964, p. 41].
One of the key differences between Canadian and foreign
auditors during this period was the geographic scope of opera-
tions within Canada. Most of the Canadian audit firms were
niche players; they were specialized in particular industries and
locations. The foreign firms, however, quickly established a
wide geographic network. This may have been a result of their
connection to investment trusts with widely dispersed assets or,
in several cases, their entry into the Canadian market as audi-
tors of the railways. In order to meet the needs of railway au-
dits, these audit firms were forced to develop the office network
and abilities to operate across significant distances within
Canada.
The final issue to be discussed is the steady rise of concen-
tration in Canada compared with Tedlow’s [1988] observations
on the pattern of concentration in the U.S. The lack of a dra-
matic rise in concentration during the 1920s compared with the
U.S. can be attributed to differences in the two economies dur-
ing this period. In the U.S. the “roaring Twenties” saw a period
of prosperity and growth that triggered the surge in mergers.
Canada however did not share this period of growth. Bliss
[1987] refers to this period in Canada as the “stuttering Twen-
ties”. Canada recovered more slowly from the First World War
than the U.S. and entered the 1920s with a severe capital deficit
that prevented rapid expansion. The entire period through the
First World War, depression and Second World War was thus
marked by steady conservative growth in Canada.
The other difference between Canada and the U.S. was
their approach to the regulation of “trusts” and other monopo-
listic behaviour by firms. The U.S. adopted the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law in 1890 and began to enforce these provisions
through the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. After the de-
pression further legislation was enacted to address price dis-
crimination, increase the damages that could be sought and
eased the burden of proof [Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 12-13].
These legal remedies ended prior surges of mergers until entre-
preneurs could invent new forms of organization and contract-
ing that did not violate the letter of the law. The result was a
series of ebbs and flows in merger activity in the U.S. Canada
actually enacted anti-trust legislation prior to the U.S. in 1889
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but this legislation used a criminal burden of proof that made
enforcement difficult. The Act was amended in 1923 to prohibit
mergers to the detriment of the public but the same burden of
proof was maintained. This Act remained in place until 1986.
During that entire period only one successful prosecution was
recorded [Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 197]. In Canada, then,
concentration was not curtailed by legislation but was not cata-
lyzed by rapid market growth. The result was the slow steady
increase in market concentration reflected in the data analysed
in this paper.
CONCLUSION
The Canadian audit market, like that of other countries,
emerged in response to the creation of capital intensive indus-
tries, joint-stock companies and government intervention in fi-
nancial reporting. The accounting firms that served this market
in Canada were a mix of international firms (most notably Price
Waterhouse, Peat Marwick Mitchell and George Touche) and
domestic firms. Among the Canadian firms few could compete
for market share with the international firms during this pe-
riod. The exceptions were the Clarkson partnerships, P.S. Ross
and Sons, and, to a lesser extent, the Riddell partnerships,
Thorne Mulholland Howson & McPherson, and Edwards Mor-
gan.
The Canadian audit market during this period was concen-
trated among a small set of suppliers. The six largest audit
firms provided 42% of all audits in the sample. Among the
larger audit firms, the international firms had a more geo-
graphically diverse set of clients than the Canadian firms but all
of the large firms had clients spread across a diverse set of
industries. Smaller firms in the Canadian marketplace appear
to have followed a niche strategy, usually concentrating on a
small geographic market or, to a lesser extent, on particular
industries. There is also evidence of market segmentation by
stock exchange listing with listed companies more likely to
choose one of the large audit firms, and companies listed on
foreign markets showing a preference for the international ac-
counting firms.
The overall level of concentration in the market during this
period was below the threshold usually associated with mo-
nopoly pricing (approximately 60% of the market served by the
top four firms [Cubbin, 1988, p. 62]). However, the existence of
niche markets in geographic areas, industries and, to a lesser
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extent, stock exchanges suggests that firms may have been able
to exercise some monopoly power. In contraindication to this,
however, the openness of the Canadian market to international
firms suggests that entry and exit to the market was relatively
easy. The potential for competition where monopoly rents were
possible may be a key factor in maintaining the efficiency of the
industry.
All of the Canadian firms, listed in this study of the pre-
World War Two audit market in Canada, have disappeared.
Clarkson merged with Arthur Young (which became Ernst &
Young), P.S. Ross & Sons merged with George Touche to form
Touche Ross (now Deloitte Touche), and Edwards Morgan
merged with Deloitte (now Deloitte Touche). Thorne Riddell
became KPMG in Canada in 1979. The Thorne Riddell firm
brought together several of the ranked firms during this period
including Thorne, Riddell, Barber, Hudson, and Helliwell. This
firm, and its predecessors, was an explicit attempt to remain an
independent Canadian partnership [Crate, 1970].
As Cubbin [1988, p. 48] notes, mergers are the key mecha-
nisms by which market concentration increases. Historically,
Canadian competition policy has focused on removing barriers
to trade rather than restricting corporate size or concentration
[Caves et al, 1980]. The openness of the audit market during
this period and the increasing concentration over time are re-
flections of this policy. The impact of the disappearance of Ca-
nadian nameplates from audit firms and the increasing concen-
tration of auditors in the post-Second World War period
requires study to further our understanding of the evolution of
the Canadian audit market.
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